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Abstract 
Encountering the increasing demand for high-performance computational re-
sources in academic as well as commercial organisations, utility computing offers 
a solution by providing users with on-demand availability of requested computing 
services. Approaches to the fundamental issue of resource allocation include the 
use of technical scheduling mechanisms as well as introducing economic ideas 
into the allocation schemes. Technical scheduling mechanisms are often very sim-
ple (such as first-in-first-out) but suffer under the shortcoming to adequately pri-
oritize jobs in times when demand exceeds supply. As empirical studies show, 
Grids (such as PlanetLab) are frequently characterized by huge excess demand 
for resources. This is where economic models such as markets come into play. 
Hitherto, market mechanisms are either (too) simple or too complex for usage in 
Grids. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, a mechanism for Grids is pro-
posed, which is still simple but geared up for use in the Grid. Secondly the 
mechanism is embedded in state-of-the-art Grid middleware Sun N1 Grid Engine 
6. Thirdly, it is shown by means of a numerical case study that this mechanism is 
superior to other commonly used mechanisms. 
 
Keywords:  Utility Computing, Grid Computing, Market-based Scheduling, 
Pay-as-Bid, Sun N1 Grid Engine 
 
1 Introduction 
The number of complex and elaborate calculations which require increasingly 
powerful and faster computing resources has been constantly growing. At the 
same time, resource owners intend to keep their resource inventory at a minimum 
level to avoid high total cost of ownership. A promising solution to these diverg-
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 ing trends is to pool together distributed, computational resources to large clus-
ters, so called “Grids”, that can provide users with sufficient computing resources 
on-demand (Foster et al. 2001). Grid computing is often denoted as utility com-
puting, as computing resource are utilities like water or electricity and can be ac-
cessed dynamically (Rappa 2004). Recently, mainly two utility computing initia-
tives have made waves in the community: Sun’s One-Dollar-Per-CPU-Hour1 and 
Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud2 are prominent examples for the industry take-
up of utility computing offerings. 
Concerning their size and build-up, Grid systems can be classified into three 
types: Cluster Grids are sets of cooperating computer hosts in a cluster that offer a 
single point of access to users within a project or department. Enterprise or Cam-
pus Grids enable the sharing of computer resources for members of different pro-
jects or departments within an organisation. Global Grids realize the Enterprise 
Grid idea across organisational boundaries and therefore allow for the creation of 
large virtual resource sharing systems (Joseph et al. 2004). 
The key problem in distributed resource sharing environments, be it Cluster, En-
terprise or Global Grids, is allocation, i.e. how to distribute the scarce resources to 
requesters at what time. The common approach to this problem is to use technical 
schedulers (such as first-in-first-out) to determine the allocation. Those technical 
schedulers are hampered by the fact that they cannot define reasonable priorities 
in cases when there is excess demand for resources (Stößer et al. 2007).  
In recent years, the idea of employing market based mechanisms attracted more 
and more interest due their ability to base the allocation on the real demand and 
supply situation (Smidt 1968; Sutherland 1968). As a side effect, sophisticated 
pricing models are facilitated. 
In this paper, we will focus on Enterprise Grids and in particular on Sun N1 Grid 
Engine (N1GE). The results we achieve here, whether the market mechanism can 
be used for N1GE as well, can be generalized to other Enterprise Grids. The rea-
son why we refer to N1GE is to assure that our market solution is not just purely 
theoretical but solidly founded in the real world. N1GE is a distributed resource 
management and scheduling system from Sun Microsystems which operates on 
the Enterprise Grid level (N1GE User’s Guide, 2005). Being an extension of the 
Solaris operating system, it administers and dynamically allocates the shared pool 
of heterogeneous resources such as computing power, memory and licensed soft-
ware within an organisation. The usage of these resources is managed in a way to 
best achieve the goals of the organisation, such as productivity, timeliness and 
level of service. Concerning the IT infrastructure itself, a more efficient utilisation 
provides the basis for the reduction of total cost of ownership and the increase of 
return on assets for the organisation’s computing facilities. N1GE has been em-
ployed for setting up Grids within organisations like companies and universities, 
each comprising a cluster size of around 500-2,000 CPUs. 
N1GE provides means of submitting requests for execution of computationally 
demanding tasks, so called “jobs”, to the users associated with the system. A 
technical scheduler orchestrates the allocation of jobs to the available shared re-
sources by arranging the jobs in a central queue, using a variation of configurable 
                                                 
1
 http://www.sun.com/service/sungrid/overview.jsp, February 13, 2007 
2
 http://www.amazon.com/gp/browse.html?node=201590011, February 13, 2007 
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 policies. These policies represent the prevailing precedence structure among sin-
gle users, departments and projects within the organisation and thus conduce to 
the appropriate entitlement in the competition for computational resources. Ad-
ministrators of N1GE are provided with tools for policy adaptation as well as sys-
tem monitoring, controlling and reporting. 
This paper is novel and unique as it proposes a mechanism for Grids which is 
fairly simple but specifically designed for usage in the Grid. The proposed 
mechanism is embedded in state-of-the-art Grid middleware Sun N1 Grid Engine 
6. Furthermore, we show in a numerical case study that this mechanism is supe-
rior to other commonly used mechanisms. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a motiva-
tional scenario which shows how the market mechanism can be integrated in the 
current scheduler of N1GE. Section 3 covers related efforts in developing market-
based market mechanisms for scheduling in the Grid. Section 4 introduces the 
base model of allocation algorithms. Section 5 presents an extension to this base 
model which tailors the mechanism to the Grid. A numerical case study is given 
in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper with a brief summary and gives an 
outlook for future research opportunities. 
2 Motivational Scenario 
The N1GE scheduler consists of a waiting queue with pending jobs and a techni-
cal scheduler that assigns waiting jobs to idle resources (see figure 1). The user 
submits a job combined with a specification of requirements of the job. There are 
two different groups of specifications, namely hard and soft state. Hard state re-
quirements are essential for a job to run. If no resource fits the required specifica-
tions, the job will be ignored by the scheduler and remains pending. Soft state 
requirements are tried to be considered, but the job’s processing does not depend 
on them. If no further specification is given by the user, a job is assigned to a ran-
dom resource which fits the requirements. If the job’s requirements cannot be ac-
complished by the assigned resource, e.g. the memory size does not suffice, the 
job fails and the user is notified. In the N1GE scenario, a system administrator is 
usually responsible for submitting the resource specification. End users do not 
need to care about the resource requirements of their jobs. 
After receiving the job requests, the scheduler places the jobs on the waiting list of 
pending jobs. The position of a job in the waiting list is determined by the job’s 
priority value. This priority value is calculated by the scheduler using a pre-
defined mix of different policies. There is one global waiting list under a central-
ized administration for all pending jobs in the Grid environment. 
An excerpt of different policies is given next (Chaubal 2005): 
• Entitlement policy (Ticket Policy, Share Based): Fair share (resp. 
proportional share) with manually (by the administrator) set shares for 
individual users, user groups, a department or a project. 
• Urgency policy: Policy with deadline contribution (increase of dispatch 
priority for jobs which will reach their deadline soon), wait-time 
contribution (increase of dispatch priority for jobs that have been waiting 
for a long time) and resource requirement contribution (change of dispatch 
priority for jobs based on the resources they requested). 
               ________________________________________________________________________A Pay-as-Bid Mechanism for Pricing Utility Computing      
               701      
  
• Custom policy (POSIX): Standard users can sort their jobs according to 
their importance by assigning different priority values. These ratings apply 
only to the user’s own jobs. 
• Override policy: The administrator can manually intervene and modify the 
dispatch priorities. 
 
Figure 1: Scheduling in the Sun N1 Grid Engine 6 
 
An example policy mix can look like this 
ccuueemix NWNWNWP *** ++=  
where mixP  is the dispatch priority, eN  is the normalized entitlement priority (on 
an interval between 0 and 1) and eW  is the entitlement weighting factor. uN , uW , 
cN  and cW are defined accordingly for the urgency and custom priorities. 
The dispatch priority for each pending job is reevaluated periodically. The time 
interval for this reevaluation is defined by the system administrator. The job 
length is not taken into account for the scheduling. Once a job is allocated, it can 
use the resource until it is finished. This leads to a possibility of manipulation. A 
user can submit a job with e.g. an endless loop in order to block resources. In this 
case the administrator can stop the job manually or a limit of maximum process-
ing time can be defined. If a job exceeds this limit it is automatically terminated. 
Market mechanism can be attached to the system by incorporating them as a new 
policy to the priority values. The administrator defines weights for the rules of the 
market mechanism in the policy mix and can hence influence the impact the new 
policy has on the dispatch priorities. Introducing a market-based mechanism to the 
Grid Engine scheduler allows users to directly influence their dispatch priority by 
submitting bids along with their jobs. To be useful for N1GE, the market mecha-
nism must meet the following requirements (Stößer et al. 2007, cf. Table 1). 
Requirement Scope Description 
Allocative  
efficiency 
Economic Allocative efficiency is the overall goal of mar-
ket mechanisms for Grid resource allocation. A 
mechanism is allocative efficient, if it maximizes 
the utility across all participating users (welfare 
or overall “happiness”). 
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Budget-balance Economic A mechanism is budget-balanced if it does not 
need to be subsidized by outside payments. 
Computational 
tractability 
Functional The market mechanism needs to be computed in 
polynomial run time in the size of the number of 
resource requests and offers. 
Online  
Mechanism 
Functional The allocation of the mechanism needs to be 
made instantaneously, as the market assumes the 
role of operating system schedulers. 
Simplicity Functional The mechanism needs to be simple such that the 
participants understand the mechanism and the 
bidding strategy. 
Table 1: Requirements for the market mechanism 
3 Related Work 
There are two other basic groups of allocation schemes dealt with in Grid-related 
literature which aim at distributing fractions of a resource among requesters: fair 
share and proportional share mechanisms. 
• Fair share mechanism  
Fair share mechanisms belong to the group of technical schedulers. One 
example is the SHARE scheduler proposed by Kay and Lauder (1988). 
Opposed to other technical schedulers, the idea behind fair share is to be 
fair to users rather than to processes. It is a scheduling strategy in which 
the usage of a certain resource (mainly CPU time) is equally distributed 
among system users (as opposed to equal distribution among processes). In 
a group of n users, everyone will receive a fraction of n1 of the available 
resource. Different fair share implementations allow the administrator to 
partition users into groups and apply fair share to these groups as well. The 
most common way of implementing the fair share scheduling strategy is to 
recursively apply the round-robin scheduling strategy. The drawback of 
the fair share strategy is that all parameters are pre-specified and set by the 
system administrator. The users have no influence on the allocation. From 
an economic perspective, the fair share strategy reaches only a very low 
level of allocative efficiency; except in the case that all users have the 
same utility for a share of the resource. On the downside, fair share is a 
simple, online, budget-balanced mechanism. 
• Proportional share  
To alleviate the problems encountered with fair share and to increase effi-
ciency, proportional share mechanisms were introduced. Proportional 
share initially allows for resource distribution with shares of unequal size 
for different users accounting for varying importance among them. 
Whereas scheduling according to pre-set, fixed shares for different users 
remains technical, market-based proportional share mechanisms dynami-
cally base the resource share on the users’ reported valuations, their 
“bids”. The total amount of available resources is distributed among the 
requesters according to the fraction their reported valuation amounts to in 
the sum of reported valuation across all resource requesters: a user i  with 
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reported valuation iv will receive a fraction of ∑
=
n
j ji vv 1 of the available 
resource when a group of n users is competing for resource access. Sys-
tems using proportional share as allocation scheme were proposed by 
Chun and Culler (2000), Stoica, Abdel-Wahab et al. (1996) and Lai et al. 
(2004). Chun and Culler (2000) employ the idea of proportional share on a 
market where multiple requesters compete for computing time. The system 
aims at optimizing for user value and utilizes a scheduler which assures 
that each requester receives a share of the resource which corresponds to 
the fraction of its reported valuation for the resource. The problem with 
market-based proportional share is that it does generally not support Qual-
ity of Service assertions. The mechanism holds the risk that requesters are 
not able to obtain the necessary resources (Lai et al. 2004); the share of re-
sources provided to a requester, i.e. the actual service level returned to the 
requester, will generally be below or above this requester’s required ser-
vice level. More importantly, the basic form of market-based proportional 
share as suggested by Chun and Culler (2000) does not support advance 
reservation and may result in high latency which is fatal for interactive ap-
plications (Lai et al. 2004). For their Tycoon system, Lai et al. (2004) 
tackle latency problems and incorporate advanced reservation for re-
sources and an incentivising payment scheme in the basic market-based 
proportional share mechanism. In summary, proportional share mecha-
nisms satisfy all requirements except the most important one, allocative ef-
ficiency. 
In the following we will explore an alternative mechanism – a so-called pay-as-
bid mechanism (Sanghavi and Hajek 2004) – that may improve on these present 
mechanisms.  
4 Basic Model 
Let τ be an allocation mechanism that splits up one unit of a perfectly divisible 
good among n  users. The vector ],...,[ 1 nwww =  comprehends the non-negative 
bids of the users. These bids equal the payments the users have to make for the 
share of the resource that is assigned to them. This share is referred to by 
],...,[ 1 nxxx =  and is calculated according to the pre-specified τ . Thus )(wx ii τ=  
is the quantity user i  is allocated as a result, given a payment vector w . 
The allocation mechanism τ  is considered valid if it satisfies the following four 
properties (Sanghavi and Hajek 2004): 
1. It is an allocation: 0≥iτ and ∑ =i i w 1)(τ  for all values of w  such that 
∑ >i iw 0 ; a zero bid will always get zero allocation. 
2. It is smooth: ),( iii ww −τ is differentiable, increasing and concave in iw for 
all iw− . 
3. It is symmetric in the user indices, such that  ))(()( )( ww ii σττ σ= for all 
permutations σ  of the indices ni ,...,1= . 
4. It is scale free, such that )()( ww ii τγτ =  for all real 0>γ  and ni ≤≤0 . 
               Philipp Bodenbenner, Jochen Stößer, Dirk Neumann-________________________________________________________________________      
               704
  
Given this problem formulation, Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) propose an allocation 
mechanism τ  which is shown to be optimal for two users. The two users, referred 
to as l  (“low bidding”) and h  (“high bidding”), have a payment vector ),( hl ww  
with hl ww ≤ . The optimal mechanism 
*τ , guaranteeing the best worst case 
fractional efficiency3 and can be devised as follows: 
h
l
hll
w
w
ww
2
),(* =τ   and 
h
l
hlh
w
w
ww
2
1),(* −=τ  
It can be shown that a Nash Equilibrium exists for any scenario with valid user 
utility functions and a valid allocation mechanism τ, i.e. it satisfies the properties 
given in chapter 2. A utility function is considered valid if it is differentiable, con-
cave and strictly increasing. The Nash equilibrium point can be regarded as the 
result of a hypothetical repeated game where users give “myopic best responses”: 
bids are continuously adjusted based on the market information generated by pre-
vious iterations and finally converge to the values which constitute the equilib-
rium (Sanghavi and Hajek 2004). 
Compared to any other valid mechanism, the basic model generates at least an 
equally high social welfare in its Nash Equilibrium point. Furthermore, the 
uniqueness of this Nash Equilibrium can be guaranteed. Hence, the mechanism is 
not only optimal for the worst case, but even for any pair of valid value functions. 
For two buyers, the worst case fractional efficiency of *τ  adds up to 87 %. The 
mechanism ends up in this worst case scenario when both buyers have linear value 
functions4.  
This difference in the levels of efficiency is caused by the different pricing 
schemes. While proportional share uses homogeneous pricing, Sanghavi and Ha-
jek (2004) introduce a discriminatory pricing mechanism. The buyer with a lower 
bid pays a higher price per share than the high bidder. This volume discount en-
courages high bidders to bid higher, and thus closer to their true valuation, com-
pared to a scenario with a uniform pricing scheme where users can potentially 
benefit from shading their bids downwards. 
In general, the pricing is given by 
receivedquantity
paidamount
i wp
_
_)( = . This equals the price the 
user would be paying for the entire unit given his bid. Thus, for the Sang-
havi/Hajek mechanism, in the two buyer case the following pricing scheme is ap-
plied:  
hl wwp 2)( =   and  
lh
h
h
ww
w
wp
−
=
2
2)(
2
  with hl pp ≥ . 
Sanghavi and Hajek (2004) developed an extension of the above mechanism from 
two to n  buyers. This mechanism still has the property of a “volume discount”, 
i.e. higher bidders pay lower prices.  
                                                 
3
 The fractional efficiency is defined as 
∑
∑
i ii
i ii
xU
xU
)(
)(
*
, with ∑∑ ≥ i iii ii xUxU )()(
*
 x∀  
4 In addition, the slope of the value function of one buyer has to be half the slope of the other 
buyer. As a comparison the worst case efficiency of the proportional share mechanism is 82.84% 
(for a proof see Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004). 
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For n  buyers and a given payment vector ),...,( 1 nwww = , the following mecha-
nism is proposed: 
ds
w
w
s
w
w
ij
ji
i )1(
1
0 maxmax
*
∫∏
≠
−=τ  
with at least two 0≥iw  and maxw being the maximum bid. 
Since it satisfies the four previously given requirements, the mechanism *τ is 
valid. The given mechanism simplifies to the optimal mechanism proposed for 
two buyers when n is set to 2. 
In contrast to the case for two buyers, it is hard to determine an exact value for the 
worst case efficiency for an unlimited number of buyers. Instead, Sanghavi and 
Hajek calculate an interval as an approximation for the worst case efficiency: 
875.0)(
))~((
8703.0
*
*
≤≤
∑
∑
i ii
i ii
xU
wU τ
 
Obviously, the proposed mechanism is still close to the theoretical maximum 
worst case efficiency, i.e. 87.5%. But a guarantee that the mechanism *τ  is the 
optimal one can no longer be given. 
5 Extended Model 
To adapt the basic model to the domain of scheduling in a Grid environment, with 
a particular focus on the N1GE scenario, further considerations have to be done. 
The following section presents a number of extensions to the basic model which 
are required to make the scheduling mechanism applicable for large-scale re-
source clusters retaining the economic features: 
• Re-evaluation of the Priority Value 
Recalculation of the priority values of all pending jobs is necessary when-
ever a new job enters the waiting list. This is required since every new bid 
would change the allocated share of each waiting job. The re-evaluation of 
all jobs would put quite some load on the scheduler if a large number of 
jobs enter the waiting queue within a short time interval. This problem can 
be prevented if the recalculation is not done for every new job, but accord-
ing to a pre-specified time window. All jobs arriving at the waiting queue 
during such a window are gathered and the recalculation is done for all of 
the jobs at once. A problem that could arise when time windows are em-
ployed is that jobs arriving at the beginning of such a window are delayed 
before being put on the waiting queue. This is especially undesirable for 
time critical and urgent jobs. Therefore the time window has to be speci-
fied accordingly (e.g. re-evaluation is done every 2 seconds) to minimize 
the delay of the jobs.  
• Feedback 
For a convergence to the Nash equilibrium point, the users need feedback 
on their bids to see how much share of the good they received. Using this 
partial market information, they will adjust their bids in myopic best re-
sponses to finally reach the Nash equilibrium point. The N1GE scheduler 
does not support direct feedback yet. The reporting tool for the waiting list, 
named qstat in N1GE, shows the priority value for each job, but this is the 
accumulated value for all policies that are part of the policy mix in the 
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 specific scenario. To ensure a convergence to the Nash equilibrium it 
might be necessary to extend the tool in such a way that it reports the frac-
tion of the priority value that was allocated to each job according to the 
submitted bid. The “won” priority value should only be reported to the 
user that submitted the respective job. Otherwise it might exhibit the pos-
sibility for a user to draw conclusions on the other users’ valuations and 
consequently influence his future bids in such a way that the Nash equilib-
rium is no longer reached. 
• Bid Updating 
Related to the issues of re-evaluation of the priority value and feedback is 
bid updating: Shall the mechanism allow bidders to update their bids after 
submitting the jobs to the waiting queue? Considering a periodic re-
evaluation of the priority value, this would not increase the computational 
effort since priorities are updated anyway. It still needs to be analysed if 
bid updating has any impacts on the economic properties of the mecha-
nism. But it probably would not change these properties since bid updating 
can be interpreted as part of the “myopic best response” bidding which 
leads to the Nash equilibrium. It would allow bidders to directly react on 
the positioning of their jobs in the queue. 
• Job Starvation  
The current Sanghavi/Hajek mechanism entails the problem of job starva-
tion. If a user submits a job with a very low bid the job will be displaced 
by all following jobs with a higher bid. Thus this job will probably never 
proceed to be executed. To diminish this setback a waiting time bonus 
could be introduced. This instrument is already incorporated in the N1GE 
urgency policy and allows increasing the priority value of a job according 
to the time it has already waited. Another possibility would be a deadline 
for pending jobs. After a certain specified time of waiting in the queue the 
job will be “killed” and taken out of the queue. The user who submitted 
the job will be informed. This solution can be combined with the possibil-
ity for users to update their bids. Should the previous bids not suffice for 
the job to advance in the queue, the user can increase the bid value. If this 
is not done, the job will eventually be dismissed by the system.  
• Job Length 
The current disregard of the job length when calculating the priority values 
is another topic to be discussed. Currently the job length is not taken into 
account at all for determination of the job’s order in the queue. Conse-
quently, the mechanism is not “merge-proof” (Moulin 2004): It might be 
unattractive for users to submit short jobs with high urgency. These kinds 
of jobs are very expensive compared to longer jobs. Hence users might 
tend to merge smaller jobs to one big job to pay the “entrance fee” to the 
waiting list only once. Submitting a merged job with a bid that equals the 
sum of the single bids of the merged bids could lead to a much better posi-
tion in the waiting queue compared to submission of the single jobs. It 
might thus be useful to base the allocation on the lengths of jobs, which 
however creates the need for determining a job’s length beforehand. 
Though there are tools for roughly estimating the duration of a specific 
job, incorporating them will doubtless have a negative effect on the ease of 
use of the mechanism. 
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 • Payment 
It has to be specified at what time of the allocation process the user has to 
make his payment. It might happen that the job is rejected because none of 
the machines fits the job’s required specifications or that it fails during 
execution. If the user has to pay directly after submitting his job to the 
waiting list, he has to be refunded in these cases where the execution of the 
job fails. A payment that is made in the first stage of allocation is also 
problematic when bid updating is allowed. For every modified bid that he 
submits he has to adjust his payment. A solution would be to account only 
for jobs which passed the execution phase successfully. 
6 Case Study 
In the following case study, fair share, proportional share and the extended model 
are compared concerning their allocation and the resulting efficiencies. They are 
assumed as being incorporated as policies in the N1GE scheduler and the only 
policies to determine the dispatch priority; all other available policies are 
weighted with 0. 
Suppose two users are competing for resources in this N1GE environment. Cur-
rently all resources are blocked with running jobs. The waiting list for pending 
jobs is empty. Now the two users submit their jobs iJ , with 2,1=i , along with the 
resource specifications required for the job’s execution. For the proportional share 
and the Sanghavi/Hajek pay-as-bid mechanism each user additionally submits his 
bid iw . 
6.1. Allocation and Pricing 
The scheduler computes the priority values according to the pre-specified schedul-
ing mechanism, here: fair share, proportional share and extended mechanism. The 
share for each user is denoted by ix . The users’ quasi-linear utility functions are 
given by 1111 5.1)( xpxxU −=  and 2222 4)( xpxxU −=  where ip  is user ith unit 
price, i.e. the price user i would have to pay if he got the whole resource unit. Fur-
thermore, assume the centralized resource provider to have a quasi-linear utility 
function ∑= i iiP xpxU )(  with no reservation prices. This is a quite realistic as-
sumption in Enterprise and Campus Grid settings. Consequently, social welfare 
can be computed as iiP xxxUxUxUxU 45.1)()()()( 21 +=++= . 
Fair Share 
Applying the fair share scheduling strategy, in which each user receives an equal 
share and no payments arise from this allocation, the priority value for all users 
can be calculated as 
nix
1
= . In the current example with two users, 1x  and 2x  are 
consequently set to 0.5 and 021 == pp . This allocation results in the valuations 
75.0)(1 =xU , 2)(2 =xU  and 0)( =xU P . Summing up the individual valuations, 
the fair share mechanism creates welfare of 75.2)( =xU , which corresponds to an 
efficiency ratio of 68.75% compared to the optimal allocation; In this optimal al-
location, the high bidding user is given a priority value of 1.0 whereas the low 
bidder receives nothing. This allocation would create the maximum social welfare 
of 4. 
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Proportional Share 
The example applies a dynamic type of proportional share mechanism in which 
the users submit bids to the provider. After receiving the bids, the provider dis-
tributes fractions of the priority value according to the pre-set allocation rule 
∑
=
i i
i
i
w
w
w)(~τ  to the users.  
Concerning the pricing, it is assumed that a pay-as-bid rule is applied: Each user is 
required to finally pay a total sum which equals his submitted bid. For the pay-as-
bid-rule, the unit price pi for user i can consequently be computed as 
i
i
iiii
x
wpxpw =⇔= . With proportional share, however, 
∑
=
j j
i
i
w
w
x and thus 
∑= j ji wp , that is user 1 and user 2 have to pay the same unit price. 
For two users, the given utility and pricing functions, the mechanism arrives at the 
Nash equilibrium5 bid vector ),( *2*1* www = =(0.2975, 0.7934). In this Nash equi-
librium, 113
*
1
*
1 )(~ == wx τ  is allocated to user 1 and 118*2*2 )(~ == wx τ  to user 2 and 
no user i has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its bid *iw . The unit prices 
are 1.1*2
*
1 == pp . 
Thus the proportional share mechanism generates an overall social welfare of 
32.345.1)( 118113 =⋅+⋅=xU and an efficiency ratio of 82.95%. 
Extended Model 
According to the optimal allocation mechanism *τ  for the two users given above, 
the Nash equilibrium point is reached for the bid vector ),( *2*1 ww  = (0.28125, 
0.75) and the following shares are allocated to the users: 
User 1: 1875.0
2
)(
*
2
*
1*
1
*
1 ===
w
w
wx τ  
User 2: 8125.0
2
1)(
*
2
*
1*
2
*
2 =−==
w
w
wx τ  
In the Nash equilibrium, the extended model results in an overall social welfare of 
53125.38125.041875.05.1)( =⋅+⋅=xU . Hence, the allocation according to the 
extended model reaches an efficiency ratio of 88.28% for this setting, which is 
significantly higher than the results of the fair share and proportional share alloca-
tions. 
Applying the pay-as-bid-rule to this allocation exemplifies the “volume discount” 
for the high bidding user 2. He pays a unit price of 9231.0
*
2
2*
2 ==
x
w
p  whereas 
user 1 has to pay a notably higher unit price of 5.1
*
1
1*
1 ==
x
w
p . 
 
 
                                                 
5 For a derivation and proof of uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the proportional share 
mechanism see Maheswaran and Basar (2005). 
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 Fair Share Proportional Share Extended Model 
Bid vector --- )79.0,30.0(),( *2*1 =ww  )75.0,28.0(),( *2*1 =ww  
Allocation 5.021 == xx  
27.0*
1
=x  
73.0*
2
=x  
19.0*1 =x  
81.0*2 =x  
Unit prices --- 09.1*2*1 == pp  
5.1*1 =p  
92.0*2 =p  
Utilities 
75.0)(1 =xU  
2)(2 =xU  
0)( =xU P  
11.0)( *1 =xU  
12.2)( *2 =xU  
09.1)( * =xU P  
0)( *1 =xU  
5.2)( *2 =xU  
03.1)( * =xUP  
Social Welfare 75.2)( =xU  32.3)( * =xU  53.3)( * =xU  
Efficiency ratio 68.75% 82.95% 88.28% 
Table 2: Comparison of the Scheduling Mechanisms 
7 Conclusion  
The extended model being inspired by Sanghavi/Hajek pay-as-bid mechanism is a 
promising addition for the N1GE scheduler. Employing a market-based mecha-
nism for resource allocation in Grids offers new possibilities on both sides, for 
providers as well as for buyers. Current technical schedulers require an adminis-
trator to specify user weights based on these users’ relative importance, regardless 
of the dynamic demand and supply situation, opening up possible inefficiencies. 
To this end, the Sanghavi/Hajek pay-as-bid mechanism allows flexible reactions 
to changes in the demand and supply situation. Moreover, it offers an elaborated 
pricing scheme where prices reflect the current market situation and induce users 
to report their true valuations to the system. The administrator no longer needs to 
adjust the weights manually and the users can directly express urgency of their 
jobs by submitting a high bid without being dependent on the administrator as a 
“mediator”. Furthermore, this usage-based pricing scheme opens up new avenues 
for both external (Inter-enterprise and Utility Computing) Grids and internal (En-
terprise and Campus) Grids.  
The implementation of the mechanism within N1GE can be done fairly easy as a 
new scheduling policy, which then would be part of the policy mix. This integra-
tion can be done without major changes in the existing architecture. As men-
tioned, an extension of the current waiting list reporting tool might be necessary to 
enable a more sophisticated feedback functionality for the users. Very important 
for a successful integration of a market-based scheduler will be the enforcement 
of the payment. Thus some kind of payment system, either based on real money or 
virtual credits, has to be integrated in the N1GE architecture which is conjunct 
with a high implementation effort.  
Comparing the extended model to other market-based mechanisms, it scores with 
its ease-of-use and an allocation mechanism that is transparent to the user. In addi-
tion, it has a noticeably increased worst case fractional efficiency in comparison to 
the proportional share mechanisms and is close to the theoretical maximum re-
garding the worst case efficiency of pay-as-bid mechanisms. Above all, the ex-
tended model imposes a very low additional communicational and computational 
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 effort on the scheduling process. It allows real-time allocations, even if the recal-
culation of the priority has to be done periodically.  
Further work has to be done on analyzing the extensions and their impact on the 
economic features of the mechanism. For this purpose it would be very helpful to 
actually implement the mechanism within the N1GE scheduler. This would allow 
for running simulations to examine the mechanism’s behaviour and performance, 
especially regarding execution time, in large scale clusters. 
In addition, the focus is on other scenarios where the mechanism can be employed 
along with the N1GE. A very interesting and challenging approach is to establish 
a decentralized version of the mechanism to support decentralized waiting queues 
as well. This might be necessary to keep the N1GE scheduler applicable for very 
large clusters (20,000+ cores), which will be demanded in the near future.  
A second scenario would change the current allocation per job to a reservation of 
timeslots of whole machines (resp. CPUs). This would enable users to book a ma-
chine for a certain time span and use it to run as many jobs as possible. The prob-
lem with this scenario is a restriction of N1GE, which allows only one task per 
CPU at a time. A possible solution to this would be virtualization, where virtual 
machines are utilized on a layer between scheduler and resources to make single 
CPUs “divisible”. 
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